Archive for the ‘Legal Updates’ Category

Supreme Court to rule on district’s ability to access employees’ text messages

Monday, March 1st, 2010

This spring, the United States Supreme Court will hear the case of City of Ontario v. Quon, which questions whether the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of text messages that a government employee sends by electronic device.

In 2001, the city of Ontario, California distributed pagers to a number of the employees in its police department. Jeff Quon, a member of the department’s SWAT team, received one of the pagers. The city had no official policy governing use of the pagers, however, the city did have a general “Computer Usage, Internet, and Email Policy” that limited the use of city-owned equipment to city business. The policy also provided that the city maintained the right to monitor and log network activity with or without notice and that there was no expectation of privacy when using city email or the Internet. Quon attended a meeting during which the police department informed those present that pager messages would fall under the city’s policy as eligible for auditing. The city also set up an informal policy governing the use of the pagers. Each pager was allotted 25,000 characters, after which the individual was required to pay overage charges. So long as employees agreed to pay for any overages, the police department made it clear that they would not audit the pagers. In August 2002, Quon exceeded the 25,000 character limit by over 15,150 characters. The chief of police requested the transcript of the pager for auditing purposes. The company responsible for contracting out the pagers voluntarily disclosed the transcripts to the city without notifying Quon. The transcripts showed that a number of Quon’s messages were personal in nature and many of them were sexually explicit.

In response to the search, Quon filed suit against the police department, claiming that the search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The district court held that, in light of the informal policy that the pager would not be audited so long as the user paid the overage charges, Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages. The court held that the police department’s liability hinged on whether the city’s intent was to uncover misconduct or to discover the usefulness of the usage limit. If it was the former, the search was unreasonable; if it was the latter, the search was reasonable. A jury found that the police chief’s intent was to determine the usefulness of the character limit. Therefore, the search was reasonable and the city was absolved of liability for the search.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the city employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the text messages they sent because there was no formal text message privacy policy in place. The court also noted that the police department’s review of the text messages was unreasonable in its scope because the department could have used “less intrusive methods” to determine whether employees had properly used the text messaging service.

The United States Supreme Court has been asked to review two questions: 1) whether a SWAT team member has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages transmitted on his SWAT pager, where the police department has an official no-privacy policy, but a non-policymaking lieutenant announced an informal policy of allowing some personal use of the pagers; and 2) whether individuals who send text messages to a SWAT team member’s SWAT pager have a reasonable expectation that their messages will be free from review by the recipient’s government employer.

The National School Boards Association has filed an amicus brief (also known as a “friend of the court” brief) in the case, citing concerns with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that an unauthorized informal policy can create an expectation of privacy in workplace electronic communications, despite an official policy to the contrary and the public nature of the communication under public records laws. This ruling, they claim, “eviscerates a school district’s ability not only to efficiently and effectively manage the workplace, but also to ensure the health, welfare and safety of its students.”

The United States Supreme Court is expected to hear arguments in the case in the spring and issue a decision by the end of June 2010.

Sixth Circuit Supports Content-Neutral Rules that Restrict Public Participation at Meetings

Wednesday, February 17th, 2010

In the case of Lowery v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., a high school football coach from Jefferson County High School in Tennessee dismissed three students from the football team for challenging his leadership. After the students’ parents were unsuccessful with their complaints to school officials, they addressed their concerns to the Jefferson County Board of Education.

The Jefferson County Board of Education had a policy in place that allowed an individual to apply to speak for five minutes at a board meeting, so long as the individual’s appearance was “not frivolous, repetitive, nor harassing.” The board granted the parents’ initial application to speak. The parents then requested another speaking spot at the next scheduled board meeting. This time, the board denied the request pursuant to their policy, finding the parents’ request to be both repetitive and harassing. The parents sued, claiming that the board deprived them of their First Amendment rights by refusing to allow them to speak at the second board meeting.

Both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found for the board, ruling that the board meeting was a limited public forum and that the board’s denial of the parents’ opportunity to speak was a time, place, and manner restriction that was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The Court held that the board’s ban on repetitive presentations was content-neutral because it had nothing to do with the subject of an individual’s proposed speech and everything to do with conducting orderly, productive meetings. The Court also felt that the policy left open ample alternative channels for the communication of the information.

It should be noted that the facts of this case initiated in Tennessee, so the application of its ruling may be limited in Ohio courts. With that said, Lowery seems to suggest that school boards may establish content-neutral rules that restrict public participation in order to better facilitate efficient and orderly board meetings. We encourage boards to review their policies to ensure they have given themselves the latitude to prevent unnecessary disruptions to the productivity of board business. We also encourage boards to take care to implement these policies in a content-neutral fashion.

Change in Background Check Requirements for Educators

Monday, February 1st, 2010

On January 1, 2010, changes became effective regarding background check requirements for licensed educators in Ohio. For initial applicants for a license, the requirements are the same: initial applicants for a license must complete both an Ohio criminal background check (BCII) and an FBI criminal background check. These checks need to be less than 365 days old to be considered valid for licensing purposes.

However, HB 1 modified the requirements for educators who need to renew a license or permit. Prior to HB 1, educators who renewed a license or permit needed to complete both the BCII and FBI checks whenever they renewed. After HB 1, however, educators who are renewing a license or permit who have lived continuously in the State of Ohio for the previous five years, and have a BCII background check on file with ODE, will need to complete only an FBI criminal background check once every five years. This makes some sense. BCII has a “rap-back” database that is designed to continuously check SSNs against arrests and conviction reports across the state. Because this database runs a continuous check, there is no longer a need for a separate check on a periodic basis.

Educators who have not lived continuously in the state for the past five years will still need to complete both a BCII and FBI background check.

ODE has posted a website of frequently asked questions regarding to Background Check Requirements, which is available online at: http://links.osba-ohio.org/88873/

Administering the Oath of Office

Friday, January 8th, 2010

Before beginning the duties of the office, each new board member is required to take an oath of office. Board inquiries concerning the administration of the oath prove to be some of the most frequently asked questions we respond to in early January. Below, I have provided answers to some of the recent questions we have received.

Who may give the oath of office? The oath may be given by a number of people, including the treasurer, any other current board member, any elected officeholder whose office has jurisdiction over the territory of the school district, a notary public, or any member of the General Assembly.

Where is it stated in law who may give the oath of office? The list of those individuals who may give the oath of office is actually outlined in three different statutes: R.C. 3313.10, R.C. 147.07 and R.C. 3.24.

May the superintendent give the oath? No, unless he or she is a notary public or otherwise qualified to give the oath.

May my spouse/sister/favorite uncle give the oath? No, unless he or she is a notary public or otherwise qualified to give the oath.

When should we give the oath of office? Typically, the oath is one of the first agenda items after the board’s organizational meeting is called to order. Taking the oath in advance of the meeting is also permissible. If the oath has been previously administered, it should be stated for the record at the organizational meeting as to when, where and by whom the oath was given.

Who can give the oath of office to our president or vice president? No separate oath of office is required to swear in your president or vice president. We understand that many boards will issue an additional oath to their president or vice president as a part of their ceremony. This is not a legal requirement. Since it is not legally required, there are no legal restrictions on who can give an additional oath of office to the board president or vice president.

We have reelected board members on our board. Do they need to take a new oath of office? Yes. Reelected board members are beginning a new term and part of qualifying for the new term of office is taking the oath of office.

Does our superintendent need to take an oath of office? No. Your superintendent is not an elected official who is required to take an oath of office.

What should our board members say as a part of the oath? A sample oath can be found in the OSBA Boardmanship book. Typically, the oath asks the board member to swear or affirm their support of the state and federal Constitution and to conduct their duties to the best of their ability and in accordance with the law.

Dependent eligibility audits for school district health plans

Wednesday, December 30th, 2009

Effective January 1, 2009, the School Employee Health Care Board (SEHCB) outlined four best practice standards, which are codified in Section 3306-2-03 of the Administrative Code. The fourth of these standards addresses dependent eligibility audits and requires all health plan sponsors offering health care plans to employees of a public school district to conduct periodic dependent eligibility audits and send the aggregate results of the audit to the SEHCB.

Dependent eligibility audits are designed to review the eligibility requirements of a health care plan and verify that all dependents currently receiving benefits under the health care plan are eligible to receive such benefits. Although the code does not specifically outline a procedure for conducting these audits, it is not uncommon for plans to ask employees to provide proof of eligibility through legal documentation (e.g., tax returns with financial information redacted, marriage licenses, and birth certificates, etc.)

We have received a number of questions from districts that have expressed concerns about the confidential nature of these verification documents. Since health care benefits are a voluntary benefit for employees, health plans have great latitude in determining their eligibility rules and the procedures they implement to enforce those rules. HIPAA likely does not cover these audits since individually identifiable health information is typically not requested. To address concerns about confidential information, districts can encourage their employees to black out personal income data, social security numbers, or other personal information that is not needed for purposes of the audit. Districts also should ensure the safe handling of confidential information throughout and after the audit process, including addressing document security and disposal with the health plan or third-party entity conducting the dependent eligibility audit.

New Ohio Ethics Advisory Opinion

Friday, December 11th, 2009

Advisory Opinion No. 2009-06, Ohio Ethics Law and Stimulus Funds

The new advisory opinion, effective Oct. 30, 2009, addresses the issue of whether  Ohio Ethics Law and related statutes apply to public officials and employees who are involved in the allocation and use of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Stimulus Bill) funds. The answer is yes. For purposes of the Ohio Ethics Law and statutes that govern conflicts of interest in public contracting, purchases and payments made pursuant to the federal Stimulus Bill are public contracts and constitute substantial things of value.

Public contract restrictions contained in Ohio Revised Code (RC) Section 2921.42 and conflict of interest restrictions contained in RC 102.03(D) and (E) prohibit public officials and employees from authorizing, using their positions to secure the authorization of, or otherwise participating in, any allocation of Stimulus Bill funds to the officials or employees or their family members or business associates.

This advisory opinion applies to all individuals who are elected or appointed to, or employed by, any public agency, including a school district regardless of whether the person is: (1) compensated or uncompensated; (2) serving full time or part time; or (3) serving in a temporary or permanent position.

The following is a link to a complete copy of the advisory opinion: http://www.ethics.ohio.gov/Opinions/2009-06.html

Ohio Supreme Court rules on post-HB9 penalties case

Wednesday, October 21st, 2009

Ohio Supreme Court expounds on statutory damages, attorneys fees and costs in post-HB 9 public records mandamus case.

The Ohio Supreme Court ruled on a recent public records case against a police department, and the ruling has implications for all public entities.  The case, State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, concerned the availability of a sealed juvenile record.

A citizen had made a public records request in late November 2007 for records to the Pierce Township Police Dept. concerning any and all reports on an aggravated arson committed by a juvenile at a residence in the previous year. However, in early November the juvenile court had sent a notice to the police department that the juvenile’s record had been sealed per R.C. 2151.356, ordering all records to be sent to the juvenile court and the juvenile’s name be redacted from any indexes or journals. The police department responded to the citizen that there were no records available. The Cincinnati Enquirer requested similar information in December 2007 and the police chief sent the redacted incident report.

The court of appeals granted a writ of mandamus to the citizen, ordering the records be produced, and awarding $2,000 in attorney’s fees, $1,000 in statutory damages and $500 in costs. The citizen appealed and the township police department cross-appealed. The court dismissed as moot the issue of the propriety of mandamus as the records had been provided by the public office, upholding the writ.

The court found that although appellant requested over $16,000 in attorney’s fees, the $2,000 award was proper, and that the ability of the court to use discretion in awarding the amount of attorney’s fees remained the same after the enactment of the revisions to Ohio’s public records law in HB 9 (126th Gen Assy.)

The court noted “the minimal public benefit achieved by the mandamus case on this point justified the award of minimal attorney fees by the court of appeals” (para 43). The court upheld the award of attorney’s fees and the maximum amount of statutory damages. Finally, the court reversed on the issue of costs, holding that costs means actual court costs, and not litigation expenses. Therefore only the $125 filing fee could be considered costs, and the $500 award was improper.

Ohio Supreme Court holds that district-wide exam questions are exempt from disclosure under public records law.

Monday, September 21st, 2009

State ex rel. Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2009-Ohio-4762

Perrea, a teacher at Hughes High School in the Cincinnati Public School District (CPS), filed repeated public records requests seeking copies of the standardized tests that are administered to all of the district’s ninth grade students at the end of each semester. Perrea stated that he was concerned about the design, implementation and scoring of the examinations, which were developed by WestEd at a cost of $270,000, and claimed that he “did not intend to use the copies for any commercial purpose.” CPS refused to produce the exams, claiming that they were not subject to release as a public record because the documents contained secure testing and copyrighted material. Perrea then filed an action with the Supreme Court of Ohio seeking a writ of mandamus to compel CPS to provide him with a copy of the examination questions and other related documents.

In a 5-2 majority decision, the Court held that, while records maintained by school districts generally fall within the statutory definition of public records, the exams were trade secrets under RC 1333.61(D) and, as such, were excepted from production as public records. The court found that because of the amount of money spent to create the exams, the fact that the exams would be of no future value if released, and the district’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of the semester exams, CPS had proved that the exams meet the statutory definition of trade secrets.

Justice O’Connor issued a separate opinion, joined by Justice Moyer, in which she concurred with the majority that the multiple choice questions were trade secrets, but dissented in regards to the essay questions included in the examinations. Justice O’Connor concluded that the CPS had publicly disclosed the essay questions by placing scoring guidelines for those questions on a password-protected intranet site. She also rejected the district’s assertion that, if the questions did not meet the definition of trade secrets, they were excepted from disclosure as copyrighted material. “Because I would hold that the realtor is entitled to partial relief, I would grant a writ of mandamus to compel disclosure of the constructed-response questions of the ninth grade semester examinations. In all other aspects I would deny the writ,” she wrote.

OHSAA Coaching Education Requirements

Wednesday, August 26th, 2009

In June 2008, the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA) Board of Directors approved a recommendation that coaches in Ohio be required to take the National Federation of State High School Association’s Fundamentals of Coaching course.

All interscholastic coaches in grades 7-12, whether certified to teach or not, paid or volunteer, are required to take the course as a one-time fulfillment. All coaches without a current pupil activity permit are required to complete the course by January 1, 2010. All coaches renewing pupil activity permits after January 1, 2010 are required to complete the course by the time of renewal.

The course takes 4-6 hours to complete online and 6-8 hours for the blended version. The cost for blended course, which is a combination of classroom and online instruction, is $55. The cost of the online version is $65

Teacher Resignations

Wednesday, July 8th, 2009

Ohio Revised Code Section (RC) 3319.15 sets out the procedure a teacher seeking to cancel his or her contract with the board must follow. The statute states that teachers, as well as superintendents and other administrators, may terminate their contracts by providing five days written notice to the employing board. However, the law prohibits teachers from terminating contracts after July 10 of any school year without the consent of the board.

So, what happens if your middle school special education teacher submits a letter of resignation one week before school is scheduled to begin? Here’s a hint: you cannot force the employee to continue working in the district. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits “involuntary servitude,” except as punishment for a crime.

Therefore, no matter how much of a bind an untimely teacher resignation may put your district in, the former employee cannot be forced to continue to perform his or her duties under a personal services contract. Instead, the statute allows the State Board of Education, upon a complaint by the employing board, to suspend the teacher’s license for up to a year. Note that the State Board rarely levies this severe penalty, choosing more often than not to issue the offending teacher a letter of reprimand.
A second issue that often arises is when a teacher who has complied with the resignation procedures of RC 3319.15 changes his or her mind. In order for an otherwise valid resignation to be rescinded, the effective date of the resignation cannot have passed, and the board cannot have taken formal action to accept the resignation. Formal action usually takes the form of a resolution or some other affirmative act or writing that shows the board’s intent to accept the resignation. Keep in mind that once the board has taken formal action, the resignation is final and cannot be rescinded unilaterally by the teacher, even if the effective date of the resignation has yet to arrive. However, if the board and teacher agree to continue the employment relationship, the teacher could rescind the resignation in writing, and the board could take action to formally accept it.

Another issue that may occur surrounding the July 10 deadline is when a board has taken action to employ a teacher, but the teacher fails to return the executed employment contract by that deadline and does not resign. Under RC 3319.08, so long as the board formally adopts the resolution and the employee accepts it, the failure of the parties to enter into a written contract would not void the agreement. However, if the teacher were to rescind his or her acceptance of employment with the district after July 10, he or she would be in violation of RC 3319.15.